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LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM AND HEALTH CARE POLICY:  
A DELIBERATIVE PROPOSAL 
 
Authors: Giuseppe Schiavone, Gabriele De Anna, Matteo Mameli, Vincenzo Rebba, Giovanni Boniolo 
 
Abstract: Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have been arguing for what they named libertarian 
paternalism (henceforth LP). Their proposal generated extensive debate as to how and whether LP 
might lead down a full-blown paternalistic slippery slope. LP has the indubitable merit of having 
hardwired the best of the empirical psychological and sociological evidence into public and private 
policy making. It is unclear, though, to what extent the implementation of policies so constructed could 
enhance the capability for the exercise of an autonomous citizenship. Sunstein and Thaler submit it that 
in most of the cases in which one is confronted with a set of choices, some default option must be 
picked out. In those cases whoever devises the features of the set of options ought to rank them 
according to the moral principle of non-maleficence and possibly to that of beneficence. In this paper 
we argue that LP can be better implemented if there is a preliminary deliberative debate among the 
stakeholders that elicits their preferences, and makes it possible to rationally defend them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a series of publications, R. Thaler and C. Sunstein have argued in favor of what they call “libertarian 
paternalism” (hereafter, LP).1 According to this approach, it is possible to reconcile respect for 
individuals’ freedom of choice with paternalistic interventions aimed at making individuals behave in 
health-promoting (and, more generally, welfare-promoting) ways. This can be done by designing 
choice situations in ways that—given individuals’ psychological tendencies, limitations and biases—
are apt to generate health-promoting (and, more generally, welfare-promoting) choices. Individuals 
retain the freedom to choose unhealthy (or self-harming) options, thereby making this kind of 
paternalism liberty-preserving. This suggestion has prompted a long-standing debate, partly reviving 
the old debate about the legitimacy of paternalism in public policy. 
 
In what follows, we first present a detailed account of LP. Hence we discuss some of the objections 
with which LP has been charged. We conclude that those charges are not fatal to the theory, but they 
point to some serious shortcomings for which we eventually suggest a ‘deliberative’ solution. 
 
WHAT IS LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 
 
Neutral designs and the argument from beneficence 
 
In their book—Nudge (2008, 6)—Thaler and Sunstein start by pointing out that the assumption that 
people typically make choices that are in their best interest is wrong. In many circumstances, they 
already noted, “individuals make inferior choices, choices that they would change if they had complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 175). 
This includes circumstances where the choice impacts the health of the individual in question. Such a 
remark was not novel in 2008, when the book was first published. Economists and psychologists have 
been studying the limits to individual decision-making for quite some time and a sub-discipline has 
developed around this pursuit.2 The novelty brought about by Nudge lies in fact in the suggestion that, 
given what we know about the aforementioned limitations, we ought to make wise (and good) use of 
that knowledge. In particular, one should exploit biases and restraints in order to make people better 
off, as judged by themselves. In this respect the authors put forward an argument from beneficence. Of 
course, there is a series of different ways of influencing people’s choices in order to increase their 
welfare, i.e. LP is not the only instance of paternalism, but apparently knowledge of irrational (or partly 
rational) behavioral patterns allows for an uncoercive kind of paternalism. 
 																																																								
1 See Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003). 
 
2 See Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Gilovich et al. (2002). 
What Sunstein and Thaler call a choice architect—i.e. anyone who has responsibility for organizing the 
context in which people make decisions—may, of course, be unaware that their (meta-)choices will 
have an impact on the decision of choice makers. But, if they are aware of this fact, they always have 
roughly five options available:3 
 
1. Maximizing welfare, all things considered They can design the choice situation with the 
aim to increase the number of decisions that promote (or are thought to promote) the health 
and welfare of the choice makers. 
  
2. Deliberately diminishing people’s welfare They can design the choice situation with the 
aim to encourage decisions that go against (or are thought to go against) the health and 
welfare of the choice makers. 
  
3. Maximizing profit (or other self-interested values) They can design the choice situation on 
the basis of considerations that have nothing to do with the health and welfare of the decision 
makers (e.g. profit considerations). 
  
4. Accommodating people’s existing preferences They can arrange the situation so as to get 
people to choose what they would have chosen anyway. 
  
5. Randomly picking architectures They can design the choice situation randomly. 
  
Option 1 is the LP option. The proponents of LP argue that any other option is undesirable (Sunstein 
and Ullmann-Margalit 1990), hence suggesting that, despite a degree of intrusiveness in option 1, we 
are left with no better strategy. Indeed, aiming at producing decisions that go against the welfare and 
health of choice makers (option 2) seems to be patently immoral. In case a choice architect chooses 
option 3, she will exploit her knowledge at the expenses of people’s welfare, or health, which also 
seems morally problematic for people employed in public institutions. Option 4 looks like the most 
promising, and, in Sunstein and Thaler’s words, it would “be an honorable attempt to avoid intrusion” 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 2). Their argument against option 4 goes as follows: the ease with which 
people change their behavior, namely changing it according to the architecture in place, makes it hard 
to tell the ‘true’ preferences apart, hence reducing the likelihood that attempts at avoiding intrusion 
result in any sensible arrangement. Finally, option 5, which apparently seems to provide a neutral 
solution, turns out to be undesirable at a slightly deeper inspection. Any random attribution will in fact 
make those randomized to some specific arrangement worse off with respect to the ones randomized to 
other—better—arrangements. 
 
To sum up, given the inevitability of the impact of meta-choices on (first-order) choices (i.e. there is no 
such thing as neutral design), not using meta-choices to encourage choices that are health-promoting 
and welfare-promoting (which would be the case in options 2, 3, 4 and 5) always seems morally 
unsatisfactory. The principle of beneficence4 together with the (generally shared) assumption that an 
omission which results in harm is just as blameworthy as any direct maleficent action, are enough 
grounds to argue that not (meta)acting is not a good option either5 in this case. The claim that having 
knowledge about people’s behavior imposes a moral burden on architects, then, seems like a fair point. 
The authors concede that there is a relevant sense in which option 1 is intrusive, and paternalistically 
so. Intrusiveness, though, comes in degrees, and does not entail full-blown coercion. Hence choice 
architects can implement the first option respecting freedom of choice. Sunstein and Thaler provide 
grounds for why we ought to endorse a paternalistic stance when certain epistemic conditions obtain 
(we know that there are architectures that would make people better off as judged by themselves), and 
argue furthermore that in those situations we have the means to leave individual liberty formally 
untouched. A policy, thus, counts as libertarian paternalistic if, while refraining from reducing the 
array of choices people have, it is selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in 
a way that will make those parties better off, “as judged by themselves” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 5). 
The intrusion proposed in option 1, hence, is not to be considered coercive as long as it does not 																																																								
3 Actually, it could be objected that there is a 6th option, that is, ‘maximizing choice’. However we think that Sustein and Thaler 
maintained that this one has to be considered as the default option. 
4 “Principle of beneficence refers to a statement of moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. Many acts of beneficence are 
not obligatory, but some forms of beneficence (…) are obligatory.” (Beauchamp and Childress 2006: 197). 
5 On omission, see Boniolo and De Anna (2006). 
preclude some options altogether. Also, it is not to be regarded as illiberal (or non-libertarian) unless it 
changes significantly economic incentives.6 
 
The epistemic conditions for LP 
 
“Choice architects” make decisions about choice situations. That is, they make meta-choices. These 
decisions require that some epistemic conditions obtain. Specifically, people must be prone to an array 
of well-known biases that range from the status quo biase and default options bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser 1988; Kahneman et al.1991; Korobkin 1998),7 to framing effects, e.g. anchoring (Strack et 
al. 1988) and reversals of preference (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), to overconfidence (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008, 31–33), hyperbolic discounting and self-control problems (Thaler and Sustein 2008, 
40–42).8 
 
The biases just mentioned do not, by any means, exhaust the number of ways in which individual 
decision-making can be affected by human laziness and limitations. Any situation in which some kind 
of cognitive bias can operate is a good candidate for the deployment of LP measures. These biases 
impair people’s decision-making in a number of ways and in a series of actual situations. The intuition 
underpinning LP is that people wouldn’t consent to choices and behaviors that they end up enacting 
due to the significant ways in which they cognitively lack and hence adjustments meant to counteract 
those biases are not only, at least prima facie, unrestrictive of individual liberty, but they also embody 
one’s own set of preferences better than one’s own behavior does. Such adjustments constitute the 
toolbox of LP policy-making. 
 
 
OBJECTIONS TO LP 
 
Sunstein and Thaler’s proposal did not go unnoticed or unquestioned. In particular, M.J. Rizzo and 
D.G. Whitman have forcefully argued against the suggestion that we could and should harness public 
policies to knowledge from behavioral economics. Their arguments have been rehearsed several times 
in the literature. 
 
Let us go through the main objections and see how they contribute to clarifying LP. The clarification 
will serve the purpose of introducing our critique, which will tackle one specific deficiency one can 
charge LP with. Such objections could be clustered around the following conceptual axes: 
 
1. Policies’ interference with self-debiasing and learning processes. 
 
2. Likelihood of the slippage from the new (mild) forms of paternalism to full-blown 
paternalism. 
 
3. Policy-makers’ inadequacy. 
 
4. (At the deepest philosophical level) LP’s lack of libertarianism.  
 
5. Choice of the default rule. 
 
Let us briefly review each of the points in turn. 
 
Policies’ interference with self-debiasing and learning processes 
 
Different arguments have been proposed in support of LP and new paternalism in general. One of these 
has a root clearly economic in nature. In standard politico-economic terms, whenever individual 
behaviors have costs that ‘spill over’ onto third parties, i.e. they produce externalities, the government 																																																								
6 This latter condition is not well-defined. Any change introduced in an architecture changes somehow costs and incentives. 
Sunstein and Thaler themselves claim, in note, that some of their own nudges alter incentives. Thus, they loosen their own 
definition saying that “[n]udges count as such, and qualify as libertarian paternalism, only if any costs are low” (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008, 8). This adjusted definition, though, lacks any precise reference to a cutoff that would be needed in order to 
define which costs count as low. 
7 According to Thaler and Sustein, the combination of loss aversion with mindless choosing may explain behavioral inertia. It 
follows that “if an option is designated as the ‘default’, it will attract a large market share” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 35). 
8 For a survey on hyperbolic discounting see Frederick et al. (2002). 
has some entitlement to intervene. On the contrary, when individuals bear all costs and benefits of their 
own actions, there is little ground for government intervention. 
 
New paternalists, however, argue that there is a special kind of “within-person externalities”, 
dubbed internalities, at stake when people engage in self-harming behavior of specific kinds.9 
Basically, an internality occurs when a person underweights or ignores a consequence of her own 
behavior for herself. If one uses the language of multiple selves, present selves impose costs on future 
selves and this grounds the same kind of governmental intervention that are seemingly non-
controversial for normal externalities. Adopting this particular perspective, some economists (e.g. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003) have developed a theory of “sin taxes”, i.e. taxes which counteract over-
consumption by consumers with self-control problems while at the same time redistribute income to 
consumers with no self-control problems. 
 
As pointed out by Whitman (2006) and Sugden (2008), internalities are about avoiding the more 
serious harm between the one currently inflicted to future selves and the one that would be inflicted to 
present selves in case paternalist policies would be put in place. The seriousness of the harm one wants 
to avoid is to be evaluated in terms of how inefficiently one situation allocates resources. In Sugden’s 
words (2008, 232): 
 
[…] before we can conclude that a paternalistic third party could do better, we need to know 
(or rather, the third party needs to know) which preferences reflect well-being and which do 
not. Is the person’s well-being greater if he saves or if he spends? If he insures or if he 
doesn’t? If he diets or if he indulges? […] 
 
The main insight coming from this shift in perspective is that there is the chance that “some, though 
probably not all, of the present self’s future costs will already have been internalized 
through intrapersonal bargains” (Whitman 2006, 12. Emphasis added). If this is the case, i.e. that 
internalities coming from present selves’ behaviors are already accounted for via intrapersonal 
bargaining, it makes little sense to nudge people into making decisions that go to the exclusive 
advantage of their future selves. This would result in the underconsumption of some goods, or in the 
reduction of future selves’ welfare in case present selves can defer costs to future selves (e.g. resorting 
to credit). On a somewhat similar ground, Sugden argues that “a person can have a clear understanding 
of his interests, sufficient for an appraisal of the market, even if his preferences are incoherent” 
(Sugden 2008, 239), and concludes that (247): 
 
We may have good reason to support many of the kinds of regulation that soft paternalists 
advocate—for example, standardized labeling of food products, standardized tariff structures 
to facilitate price comparisons, or mandatory cooling-off periods before sales of financial 
products are confirmed. But those reasons depend on specific and contestable hypotheses 
about consumers’ information-processing capacities, or their susceptibility to psychological 
cues which induce (what are construed as) distortions of judgment. 
 
We believe that the issue raised by Whitman and Sugden is a serious one, that relates back to the one 
main problem of LP, namely that it fails to provide reasons why some specific set of individual 
preferences is to be considered preferable to others. Further on, we will delve more in depth in the 
epistemic unreasonableness that underlies the assumption that there is an a priori way to adjudicate 
between competing orders of preferences which grounds the claim that one order is more ‘real’ than 
some other. Then we will sketch one way to fix this problem that does not seem to be unavoidably 
entrenched in LP. 
 
Slippery slopes 
 
A slippery slope argument (SSA) is any line of reasoning that objects to practice X on the grounds that 
X may naturally progress to Y, which everyone finds objectionable already. The naturalness of the 
progression is what makes a SSA plausible. B. Williams famously set the one condition that makes 
SSAs worth pursuing. Between the practices X and Y, there must be ways of 
either reasonably or effectively fetch a distinction (Williams 1995). Without such a distinction, no 
relevant SSA can be put forth. X and Y, hence, are two distinct practices, but, so the argument goes, 																																																								
9 The term “internality” was introduced by Herrnstein et al. (1993). 
the distinction might not be reasonably defended or it might not, “as a matter of social or psychological 
fact” (Williams 1995, 214) be effectively grounded, i.e. if X is admitted, then Y will. In essence, the 
claim that X will lead to Y entails, according to Williams, that X and Y be theoretically, or, as a matter 
of fact, distinguishable. Thus, one has to show that the two practices involved in the argument are 
distinguishable before she can proceed further to the claim that X will likely lead to Y. 
 
Proceeding from this remark, Rizzo and Whitman (2009) suggest that LP-like and full-fledged 
paternalist policies are distinguishable but lie along the same continuum that goes from non-coercive to 
coercive means of welfare-enhancing political control. “The libertarian paternalist insists on preserving 
choice, whereas the non-libertarian paternalist is willing to foreclose choice. But in all cases, a real 
question is the cost of exercising choice, and here there is a continuum rather than a sharp dichotomy” 
(Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1185, our emphasis). The very existence of this gradient is a sensible 
starting point for a thorough reflection upon how slippery the slope of LP actually is, and towards 
which end it goes. The distinction between LP and other—non-libertarian—forms of paternalism 
exists, but where exactly a line can be traced is debatable. Thus there is room for SSAs that ought to 
make clear whether and how a distinction between the two, in specific cases can reasonably or 
effectively be defended. 
 
Rizzo and Whitman further claim that the slope, the gradient between LP and non-LP, is deemed to be 
pushing policies towards the paternalist, rather than the libertarian end of the spectrum. First, they 
make one, seemingly plain, but especially interesting remark, grounding their concern that policy-
making is not always as promptly revisable as it is sometimes presented to be. Slippery slopes tend to 
involve multiple actors. Despite the uncontroversial nature of this observation, the fact, the authors 
claim, goes often unnoticed. The multiplicity of the actors can be of two main kinds: we name these 
two kinds of multiplicity vertical (or synchronic) and horizontal (or diachronic). The former refers to 
the difference between policy-makers and the people who are affected by their policies: the two sets are 
rarely, if ever, coextensive. The latter multiplicity refers to one central feature of most liberal 
democratic systems: policy-makers change over time. This entails that whenever slippery-slopes 
skeptics argue that one can do what is right today while refraining from doing what is wrong tomorrow, 
they will have to concede that, most likely, they will not be in the position to refrain from doing 
anything tomorrow. This makes the increased likelihood of undesired consequences of a non-
worrisome policy at least slightly more concerning. Again, though, this is merely a good case for the 
existence of a slope. As it stands, it gives no clue about the direction towards which one is likely to 
slip. 
 
Rizzo and Whitman do address specifically what they call the ‘expansive tendencies’ of LP and 
provide a list of the several ways in which LP policies could lead to more and more intrusive 
interventions. Going through all of the cases would amount to a different paper. Suffice it to say that 
there is a main thrust shared by all the criticisms put forth: Scientific beliefs, available facts, political 
reasons and justifications can and do change over time and in the process of change they are subject to 
many sorts of unforeseen (and sometimes unforeseeable) distortions that, this they claim, have the 
tendency of allowing for stronger interventions. We believe that, although the existence of conditions 
for the expansive tendency just sketched is well-argued, when it comes to the empirical support that the 
actual expansion has, the arguments proposed are lacking. In order to support our claim we provide one 
empirical objection to one of their points. 
 
Rizzo and Whitman (2009) make reference to a paper by Besharov (2002). In this article, the author 
shows that if one tries to ameliorate cognitive biases that interact with each other, she has to consider 
the chance that piecemeal corrections might be detrimental to the agent. He backs up his argument with 
the theory of the second-best. Briefly, 
 
“the General Theorem of the second-best optimum states that if there is introduced into a 
general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian 
conditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer 
desirable” (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, 11) 
 
Taking this theorem at face value, issues arise in case one attempts at improving people’s decision-
making via the amelioration of some, but not all, of the biases. In other words, it might be the case that 
co-existing biases offset one another, and hence fiddling with only some of them might tip the balance 
towards a lower level of welfare. Besharov’s argument is pretty technical. Rizzo and Whitman, though, 
go slightly further than he does and claim that given the likelihood of complex interactions between 
biases, there is a significant chance that LP policies that aim at correcting one bias, will end up trying 
to correct other biases in order to prevent the aforementioned welfare-reducing consequences. This use 
of the argument however, suffers from two main defects: (1) it offers no reason why perfectly rational 
policy-makers would decide to go for piecemeal corrections, given that they know there exist second-
best-like problems; (2) it overlooks the essentially ‘exploitative’ nature of LP. Biases are not meant by 
LPs to be paternalistically corrected or amended, but rather to be paternalistically ridden, so to say. 
Whereas in the former case there might be space for unexpected consequences of the kind Besharov 
envisages, in the latter, we tend to believe there is not. In fact, LP advocates try and make use of two 
pieces of relevant knowledge: (a) the knowledge that some people, when a certain set of conditions (i.e. 
a choice architecture), be it C1, is given, tend to do X, which is, in some sense,10 undesirable; (b) the 
knowledge that when a different set of conditions, say C2, surrounds a similar kind of decision, then 
people tend to do/choose/pick Y, which, in some sense, they hold to be desirable. LPs, apparently, do 
not want to make people aware of the fact that their behaviors are so and so contextually determined 
(which would be tantamount to correcting or debiasing the behaviour). They rather want to create sets 
of conditions which allow Y to happen. One thing must be conceded to LP: it has been factually very 
successful in setting the features that make up C2-like architectures.11 In order to show that the 
conditions Rizzo and Whitman envisage obtain, they will have to provide evidence that it has 
happened, at least sometimes, somewhere, that exploiting (and not amending) one or more biases has 
resulted in welfare-reducing consequences due to some unfortunate second-best choice. 
 
Further, opponents of LP have to provide historical proof that LP policies, within democratic societies 
ended up prompting more intrusive paternalistic measures.12 We maintain that there currently is no 
empirical evidence supporting either of the claims. 
 
Policy-makers’ inadequacy 
 
Another crucial issue is related to the choice of the nudgers (government officials or other “choice 
architects”). Society has the legitimate expectation that nudgers will not nudge people in directions that 
benefit some particular interest group (the group of nudgers included) instead of the whole polity. 
Furthermore nudgers are expected, when deciding concerning meta-choices, to be both informationally 
and cognitively unbiased. Thaler and Sunstein recognize that “government officials, elected or 
otherwise, are often captured by private-sector interests whose representatives are seeking to nudge 
people in directions that will specifically promote their selfish goals” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 243) 
and to overcome this problem they suggest monitoring and increasing transparency (e.g. requiring 
government officials to put all their votes, earmarks, and contributions from lobbyists on their 
websites). Quite surprisingly, however, the problem of “bad” nudgers is somewhat underrated and very 
quickly dismissed by Thaler and Sunstein. The authors focus almost exclusively on transparency and 
accountability in this respect, subscribing to the motto according to which “sunlight is the best of 
disinfectants” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 243). We think instead that the possibility that self-interested 
nudgers hijack nudges requires careful consideration. Specifically, we maintain that mechanisms to 
ascertain and monitor the competence and expertise (besides the moral integrity) of the nudgers are 
required and must be differentiated according to the different domains of LP policies. The deliberative 
solution we propose in the last part of our contribution aims precisely at addressing these concerns. 
Before proceeding to this final part, let us point to the one genuine shortcoming of LP. 
 
What preferences are ‘real’? 
 																																																								
10 We will get to this point further on. 
11 Default options for organ donations are just the most astounding success story (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). 
12 A good example of the exploitative nature behind LP can be found in Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational (2009). Although 
Ariely is not to be counted among LP advocates, the body of knowledge he is a contributor to, is the same to which LPs make 
appeal. Ariely describes what he calls the decoy effect: when people are presented with alternatives, they generally fancy having 
comparables. This results in astounding outcomes. When presented with three options A, B, (differently featured) and—A 
(practically identical to A, but with some slight deficiencies) people tend to choose A more than if they were only presented with 
A and B. This happens also when people have to choose a partner. Ariely ends up saying that “if you compared with a “–you,” 
the decoy friend will do a lot to make you look better, not just in comparison with the decoy but also in general, and in 
comparison with all the other people around. It may sound irrational (and I can’t guarantee this), but the chances are good that 
you will get some extra attention” (Ariely 2009, 15). This trivial example suggests that whoever is in the position to use the 
relevant knowledge, he/she should do so to his/her own advantage, rather than trying to debias themselves or help others be 
debiased. 
The claim that LP is a liberty-preserving way of enhancing people’s welfare, as judged by 
themselves relies on a series of assumptions. One of these assumptions is particularly debatable: That 
there are epistemically reliable tools to judge the attainment of one’s welfare. This assumption requires 
in turn that one is capable of listing people’s ‘real’ preferences.13 LP theorists readily admit that this is 
a problematic task. Sunstein and Thaler argue that “if the arrangement of the alternatives has a 
significant effect on the selections the customer makes then their true preferences do not formally 
exist” (2003, 1164). As Thaler and Sunstein show, it is the case that the arrangement of alternatives 
does influence choices in a number of contexts. Hence, the use of revealed preferences, i.e. sets of 
preferences inferred from people’s behavior, is to be rejected. Still, new paternalists need some account 
of welfare that grounds the claim that one’s welfare is increased by his/her own standards when LP 
policies are enacted. Instead of attempting to determine people’s actual preferences, Thaler and 
Sunstein try and solve the issue claiming that one’s ‘real’ preferences are those he would entertain 
under ideal and non-biased conditions. Grüne-Yanoff (2012) argues that this attempt could amount to 
two different proposals: (1) it could prompt an effort to provide actual people with actually better 
information, offering time and training to reflect upon their decision and watch how people behave or 
(2) it could refer to the counterfactual reconstruction of people’s preferences had they “complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 
1162). LP opts for (2), further arguing that, so conceived, one’s ‘real’ preferences would be his/her 
future self’s preferences. However, LP’s attempt at reconstruction suffers from at least two theoretical 
issues. As Grüne-Yanoff puts it (2012): 
 
(a) It is unclear what the three counterfactual conditions would amount to: What is complete 
information? What does “unlimited cognitive abilities” precisely mean? And how much 
willpower should one have in order not to lack self-control? In fact, “standards of complete 
information are as pluralistic as values are, and hence do not constitute a universal criterion 
for judging preferences” (2012, 642) 
  
(b) It is unlikely that any account provided for these three conditions will result in a robustly 
predictive tool for the change in individual preferences brought about by the addition of 
particular quantities of information, cognitive ability and willpower. 
  
Points (a) and (b) firmly back up our claim that LP suffers from a serious epistemic deficiency: LP is 
unable to articulate the reasons why specific sets of preferences are picked (over others). On the one 
hand the evidence that supports LP claims undermines the existence of revealed preferences. On the 
other, counterfactually reconstructed preferences are deemed to make unwarranted assumptions 
relative to information, cognitive abilities and willpower. Hence, the counterfactual reconstructive 
attempt they envisage is not grounded and the claim that long-term selves’ preferences are to be 
preferred needs better arguments. 
 
We maintain, and in the next section we argue, that, as compared to LP strategies, non-reconstructive 
and deliberative means for the assessment of people’s preferences fare much better in two essential 
respects: (1) they require that people (or some subset within the groups of stakeholders) 
be actually asked about their preferences, and (2) they do not hold true any assumption concerning 
intra-subjective bargains. 
 
Epistemic and pragmatic reasons for deliberation in health care policies 
 
We have shown that the only problem that severely affects LP is its incapability to articulate the 
reasons that ground the choice of one intrapersonal set of preferences (that belonging to future selves) 
over some other. We hereby propose a deliberative solution to this troubling issue. Specifically, we 
provide epistemic and pragmatic reasons why our (deliberative) solution is superior to that LP deploys 
(i.e. counterfactual reconstruction). A similar solution to a narrower—but related—problem (that of 
obesity), has been put forward by Anand and Gray (2009). We will expand the scope of their argument 
to health policies, broadly understood.14  
 
Epistemic superiority 
 																																																								
13 One’s welfare may be said to depend on the degree to which his/her preferences go satisfied. 
14 The focus of their argument was confined to policies concerning obesity. 
In the following paragraph we mean to show that endorsing a deliberative stance concerning health 
policy-making affords some epistemic gains and is hence a solution epistemically superior to LP. This 
superiority derives from one, central feature that deliberation as a tool, obtains: it allows for citizens to 
probe their own positions’ internal consistency. Deliberative methods, while not discounting the local 
knowledge only accessible to people there and then (which is instead the case for LP’s reconstructed 
preferences) make it possible, via the rational defense of one’s preferences over choice architectures, 
the discovery of the rationality behind one’s set of values. This is a genuine epistemic result, 
unattainable via LP reconstructive efforts. 
 
We must stress that our contention here is merely that deliberative processes afford a genuine epistemic 
result with respect to preferences over choice architectures, i.e. preferences over meta-choices. Here we 
do not discuss the possibility that reasons giving and heeding might result in a better knowledge of 
people’s preferences over choices (which, as we have seen, is a controversial claim both in case one 
refers to revealed and to reconstructed preferences). Whereas liberalism imposes extreme caution in the 
domain of personal choices (at least of those personal choices that do not impose burdens on others) 
choice environments (at least those choice environments that do not significantly restrict the array of 
options available to anyone) look like a sensible target for public deliberation. This entails that it is 
reasonable to deliberate about choice architectures, even though deliberation about one’s preferences 
over choices would be insensible. Such a consideration is even more important because currently there 
seems to be an unjustified lack of democratic control within the sphere of meta-choices. “Critically, 
although consumers chooseparticular items, conditional on the choice environment, they have no 
choice over the choice environment itself” (Anand and Gray 2009, 184). Ironically, whereas people’s 
specific preferences (i.e. preferences over choices) are held dear in the face of their alleged irrelevance 
as means of political justification, people are politically very badly positioned to defend their 
preferences over meta-choices. 
 
Summing up, we have argued that, exposing the internal consistency of people’s positions, an ideal 
conversation would help constructing (or better unveiling) tenable (meaning reasonable) personal 
preferences over meta-choices. 
 
A well-conducted deliberative process is never unsuccessful, because the rational discussion 
by itself leads participants to reflect upon the tenability of their own and their opponents’ 
positions. In short, there is always a deliberative result beyond any desired consensus. 
(Boniolo 2012, 20). 
 
Furthermore, deliberation delivers such an epistemic advantage on top of the solution to the lack of 
democratic control over the selection of choices environments. 
 
To this last, pragmatic, issue we now turn. 
 
Before beginning let us remind that deliberation is the procedure through which people, starting from 
different initial positions, try and reach a shared decision via a debate based on rational arguments and 
counter-arguments.15 
 
Pragmatic superiority 
 
We have seen that revealed preferences do not formally exist and that LP’s reconstructive efforts have 
proven unwarranted. Henceforth we will argue that, given the epistemic difficulty just summarized, 
deliberation is a viable procedure to politically legitimize health policies. 
 
Isaiah Berlin famously fetched a distinction between positive liberty (roughly the freedom to lead some 
prescribed form of life) and negative liberty (roughly the freedom not to have interferences) 
(Berlin 1969). Under a positive conception of liberty, the ideals of freedom and equality in freedom are 
fully realized in the kind of political participation that deliberation demands. Specifically, if freedom is 
self-realization and self-realization is conceived as entailing the pursuit of joint projects,16 then 
deliberation is clearly a good way (though not the only one) to promote democratic ideals of liberty. On 																																																								
15 For a discussion on deliberative democracy and its story, see Boniolo (2012). 
16 This is what an advocate of a version of positive freedom like John Dewey would claim. Whatever pursuit one might engage 
is, it is valuable because it is the realization of a project-for-us and not because it achieves some self-interested goal. 
“[D]emocracy […]is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1934, 87). 
the other hand, if we endorse a negative stance on the definition of liberty, one might wonder whether 
and to what extent deliberation and participation can help achieving the ideal standards of freedom and 
equality in freedom. Kitcher argues deliberation does so in a way that is unachievable through standard 
tools for political participation, i.e. majority rules and polls. Deliberation promotes the ideals of 
freedom and equality in freedom, preventing what he dubs unidentifiable oppression (see 
Kitcher 2001, 2011). 
 
As Kitcher points out, historically speaking, classic democratic tools, like majority rules, have served 
the purpose of annihilating identifiable forms of oppression, in order to extend negative freedom to 
oppressed groups. Identifiable forms of oppression are the tangible forms of oppression by means of 
which some specific groups in society are prevented from enjoying negative freedom. Nonetheless, 
when it comes to contrasting covert, i.e. unidentifiable, forms of oppression, subtle limitations on 
liberty that are not felt, and are difficult to trace back to specific sources, one cannot rely solely on 
punctual solutions, nor on individual initiatives that would restore equality in freedom. Instead, 
continuous spread participation in the process of democratic deliberation is a way to keep in check 
democracy itself, making sure that no hidden source of oppression is at work anywhere in society. 
Hence, also under a negative conception of liberty, deliberation offers an edge over standard forms of 
democratic participation. Deliberation applied to LP-justified policies would constitute a substantial 
attempt at democratically legitimize those policies, thereby contrasting the unidentifiable forms of 
oppression to which democracy itself is liable, and offering an effective remedy to the issue of ‘bad’ 
nudgers highlighted above. 
 
LP policies are clearly—at the very least potentially—subject to the exercise of covert forms of 
oppression. Even though LP logically entails no identifiable oppression against any particular liberty or 
group (in fact, the very core of the idea of LP is that of not impinging upon anyone’s negative freedom 
more than it already is being impinged upon), the institution of policies informed only by expert 
policy-makers looks politically suspicious for two main reasons: (1) the proper choice of the experts is 
unregulated and, even if it were, (2) the choice itself seems to stand in the face of the ideal of equality 
in freedom which ought to be promoted by democratic institutions.17 One risk that might be elicited by 
the involvement of lay citizens in the process of deliberating about meta-choices is that their 
preferences concerning architectures of choices are uninformed. However, through an appropriate 
process of tutoring of people’s preferences,18 the deliberation could both build upon the best 
knowledge available and be sensitive to people’s actual preferences, i.e. the decision will not assume 
anything about people’s conception of welfare. In this respect, the “as judged by themselves” clause 
put forth by LP can be reinterpreted as making reference to the actual judgment of a properly sampled 
group of stakeholders rather than to the counterfactual reconstruction of every individual set of 
preferences. 
 
Thus, we suggest, deliberative tools can help constructing choice architectures that are better informed 
to people’s preferences and more politically legitimate at once. They are better informed because the 
process of tutoring of preferences described above is a way to ensure that preferences voiced directly 
by citizens do not arise out of ignorance, misconception or biases. They are more legitimate because 
they are procedurally so, i.e. they are achieved via a procedure that promotes the ideals of freedom and 
equality in freedom.19 Moreover, the revisability20 of deliberative decisions keeps those in constant 
democratic check. 
 
Examples of deliberatively justified LP policies 
 
In this section we explore some examples of LP policies, mostly focused on behavioral change, and 
show how deliberation could play a significant role in the political process of policy-making. 
A host of policies have been proposed in the last years that allegedly fall under the heading of LP. We 
believe that only few of them would qualify as genuine LP policies, either because they are, essentially, 
information campaigns under another name, or because they entail some sort of change in the 
architecture of economic incentives. Some of these proposals we discuss here. 
 																																																								
17 This is also the reason why private firms should not be subject to the constraints of deliberation. Private firms do not seem to 
owe any particular toll to the foundations of democracy. 
18 Which, as we argued above, does not entail any washing-away of previously existing dispositions. 
19 For the correlation between deliberation and ligitimisation, see Boniolo (2012). 
20 Concerning the revisability of any deliberative conclusion, see Gutman and Thompson (2004, 133). 
PROMPTED CHOICE FOR ORGAN DONATION 
 
In a discussion paper issued by the Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team in 2010 (Cabinet Office 
Behavioural Insights Team 2010) that addresses the concern for the lack of organ donations in a 
healthcare system—the NHS—desperately in need for such contributions (Department of Health 2008). 
The paper addresses such topic from a somewhat LP perspective. They set up their suggestion saying 
that there is a discrepancy between the actual number of people who are enlisted in the NHS Organ 
Donor (roughly the 27 % of the overall eligible population) and what emerges from surveys (65 % of 
people would be willing to donate and 90 % are in favor of donation). This tension, they claim, means 
that people, for some reason, do not manage to live up to the standards that they set for themselves. 
Hence, they suggest that policy-makers consider the opportunity of prompting the choice of whether or 
not they would be willing to donate. This choice should be prompted upon applying for a driving 
license. Evidence that such a strategy has an impressive effect can be drawn from the several US states, 
e.g. Illinois, Texas and California (Abadie and Gay 2006). 
 
This policy, trialed in England in 2011, seems to pass the test of LP. First, the measure is not coercive 
in any relevant sense. Secondly, it does not involve the introduction of any non-negligible economic 
incentive. Third, it exploits one of the biases we mentioned above, namely the so-called power of 
defaults. And finally it nudges people towards decisions that would enhance their welfare, as judged by 
themselves (or at least as inferred from their judgments in surveys). 
 
As we have argued, however, the reasons that ground the decision to nudge people towards the 
satisfaction of their counterfactually reconstructed preferences are not compelling. In this specific case 
these reasons are even less convincing: preferences expressed in surveys are speech-acts, whose 
“statement […] does not reveal a serious willingness to incur the opportunity cost[…]. It is evidence 
simply of [one’s] willingness to incur the costs of the statement to attain its benefits” (Rizzo and 
Whitman, 2008, 19–20). One could still defend the prompted choice policy, arguing that no decision, 
after all, is being suggested other than that of taking a decision. This is a fair reply, but we maintain 
that people have some entitlement in the decision of when to decide concerning subjects that affect 
them personally. Along this line, our suggested deliberative turn entails that people be involved in the 
process of taking what we called the meta-choice. Practically, this means that a properly sampled group 
of stakeholders (in this case British citizens representative of the overall population) ought to convene 
in a deliberative platform. They should hence be provided with the figures concerning organ donations 
and the available evidence about strategies for behavioral change. After this phase of tutoring of 
preferences that relies on state-of-the-art scientific findings, people are asked to argue what they 
believe would be the best way to go. This deliberative process of reasons giving and heeding is likely 
to yield outcomes, i.e. policies, similar to the one endorsed by the Cabinet Office. Differently from the 
suggestion issued by the Cabinet Office, though, this proposal would have an edge as to its political 
legitimacy, in that it would be the result of a procedurally fair democratic deliberation. 
 
Shopping trolley re-design. Costs associated with overweight and obesity in the UK have been 
estimated at £7 billion a year (Government Office for Science 2007). This is due to bad eating habits. 
In England 65 % of adults eat less fruit and vegetables than they ought to (Bates et al. 2010). In order 
to tackle this issue, the Cabinet Office (2010) suggested following the lead of the New Mexico State 
University College.21 C. Payne found that putting a line of yellow tape with a sign designating the part 
of the trolley to be devoted to fruits and vegetables increased the amount of fruits and vegetables 
purchased without affecting the overall profit for the retailer. It is unclear how far a policy inspired by 
such evidence would qualify as LP. In fact, the only ground for the claim that people are being made 
better off, as judged by themselves, by such a policy, lies in the assumption that people know they 
should be eating five portions of fruits and vegetables a day.22 Nonetheless, the policy would indeed be 
non-coercive and it would entail no change in the architecture of economic incentives. 
 
In this instance, the ideal of deliberation would demand that, again, relevant stakeholders convene and 
be given certified and understandable information concerning obesity, overweight, their economic and 
social costs, and the effectiveness of likely strategies for the intervention. This phase of tutoring would 
be followed by arguments in favor and against the endorsement of specific policies, finally reaching 
some form of consensus around the means to be deployed to tackle the issue. Two features of the 																																																								
21 The evidence cited concerning the experiment conducted by Collin Payne at the New Mexico State University College of 
Business is said to be contained in personal communication between Payne and the Cabinet Office (2010). 
22 This, of course, unless one assumes that everyone prefers being healthy over eating junk food. 
deliberation could be controversial in this case: (1) the extent to which the deliberation manages to be 
inclusive of different social and cultural backgrounds and (1) the way in which the stakeholders 
participating will be meant to be representative of the overall population. As to (1), the deliberation 
will demand the provision of collaboratively drafted informational material in plain language and the 
facilitation of effective participation of subsets of the population unlikely to be familiar with the 
argumentative style that is proper of ideal conversations. As to (2) the case of children affected by 
policies poses a challenge to the deliberative approach just sketched. We suggest that the hosting 
institution makes sure the advocacy of interest groups inherently unable to advocate themselves (and 
hence not immediately sample-able like children or future generations) does not remain unspoken, 
possibly presenting their fair claims alongside other standard points of view within the informational 
material and granting them due space during the deliberation itself. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have shown that LP is affected by one major issue. This issue is epistemic in nature. New 
paternalists do not provide grounds for the claim that long-term selves’ preferences ought to be 
regarded as better representing—i.e. better than short-term selves’ preferences—alleged ‘real’ 
individual preferences. This epistemic problem cannot be overcome by means of deliberation 
concerning meta-choices. However, deliberation can serve the two-fold purpose of unveiling the 
internal consistency of people’s explicit preferences over meta-choices and constructing the political 
legitimacy that LP lacks, due to its somewhat elitist assumption.23 Hence we call for the construction of 
a community of properly chosen deliberators. This community would behave according to the 
principles of deliberative democracy, outlined by Gutman and Thompson (2004), and according to the 
method indicated by Boniolo (2012). We do not make assumptions about the outcomes of actual 
resolutions achieved via this inclusive deliberative procedure, but it will likely be the case that, if, as 
LP advocates claim, people hold dear their future selves’ preferences and are capable of understanding 
the arguments supporting some architectures of choices over others, then consensus will be reached 
around arrangements similar to the ones new paternalists have already proposed and experimented. 
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